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The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class*

Susanne D. MUELLER**

RÉSUMÉ:

Les conditions historiques de l'émergence de la classe dominante en Tanzanie sont examinées. La "bourgeoisie bureaucratique", par opposition à une classe capitaliste productive au Kenya, a retardé le développement du capitalisme tanzanien. Dans la première partie, les antécédants (avant 1967) de la classe actuellement au pouvoir en Tanzanie sont analysés. Dans la deuxième partie, le mouvement d'indépendance et la spécificité de classe de l'Etat post-colonial sont étudiés. En conclusion, l'auteur observe une classe et un Etat qui suivent des politiques qui ont tendance à institutionnaliser une petite bourgeoisie et un petit capitalisme.

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the historical conditions which prevented the development of a strong capitalist ruling class along the Kenyan lines in Tanzania. In Kenya, an emerging bourgeoisie controlled African political associations as early as the 1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers, traders, and clerks were the mainstay of the independence movement¹ with kulak farmers participating, but never predominating as a class "to the extent

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1. See for example A. Awiti, "Economic Differentiation in Ismani, Iringa Region: A Critical Assessment of Peasants Response to the Ujamaa Vijini Programs" (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Seminar Paper, 1972); Henry Bienen, *Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Goran Hyden, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969); Gene Andrew Maguire, *Towards Uhuru in Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

where they could become an important political force at the national level."² A productive class of capitalists thereby came *to engineer* the state in independent Kenya, while in Tanzania the dominant force rested with an unproductive "bureaucratic bourgeoisie,"³ a class awkwardly termed and poorly understood.⁴ The result in Kenya was capitalism which matured along rather classic lines, that is by increasing the productivity of labour without resulting in *absolute* immiseration;⁵ in Tanzania

2. Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 50.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-97.

4. Shivji uses the term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" "to describe the actual ruling section of the petty bourgeoisie" rather than to suggest that it is "a class distinct from the petty bourgeoisie." *Ibid.*, p. 64.

5. The word "absolute" is underlined here because the conflict between capital and labour obviously continues to exist and clearly does produce misery. The difference between the Kenyan and Tanzanian case is the difference between a capitalism which matured to extract on the basis of relative surplus value and one which continues to extract by means of absolute surplus value, although in parts of Kenya the latter continues to prevail, as it does within various sectors of advanced capitalist systems. Ernest Mandel notes this in his discussion of Marx's distinction between absolute and relative surplus value. "Introduction," in Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1977), 1:35. In short, the extraction of absolute surplus value is characteristic of a period in which there has been a minimal level of transformation in both the relations of production and in the productive forces. For further discussion see Geoffrey Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); Robert Brenner, "Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," *New Left Review*, no. 104 (1977): 25-92; Jairus Banaji, "Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History," *Capital and Class*, no. 3 (1977): 1-44. For a discussion of this point as it relates to Tanzania see Susanne D. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania," in *Socialist Register 1980*, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1980), pp. 203-226; and Susanne D. Mueller, "Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco" (Paper presented to Canadian Association of African Studies, Guelph, Ontario, 1980). Although the relative exploitation of the working class is great under advanced capitalism, absolute immiseration is greatest where capitalism is most backward.

The contention that capitalism is/has matured along more or less classic lines in Kenya is debated. See the debate between the Marxian perspective taken by Michael Cowen, "On Household Production in the Countryside," Section 3 of Michael Cowen and Kabiru Kinyanjui, "Some Problems of Income Distribution in Kenya," (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1977); Apollo Njonjo, "The Africanization of the 'White Highlands': A Study in Agrarian Class Struggle in Kenya, 1950-1979" (Ph.D.

capitalism was retarded along the lines suggested by the Narodniks⁶ with the predictable consequence of absolute pauperization suggested by Lenin.

The paper is also the beginning of a larger effort to understand why the material basis of Tanzania's ruling class acted to stymie the development of capitalism after independence. "Nizers," "bureaucratic bourgeoisie"

dissertation, Princeton University, 1977); Nicola Swainson, "The Rise of National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 8 (1977): 39-55; *idem.*, *Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1919-1977* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980); and Colin Leys, "Class Formation and Dependency: The Significance of the Kenyan Case," in *Socialist Register 1978*, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1980), pp. 241-266; on the one hand and the dependencia perspective taken by Stephen Langdon, "Multinationals, Taste Transfer and Underdevelopment," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 2 (1975): 12-35; *idem.*, "The State and Capitalism in Kenya," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8 (1977): 90-98; R. Kaplinsky, "Capital Accumulation in the Periphery - the Kenyan Case Re-examined," mimeographed (Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1979); Horace Campbell, "On the So-Called 'National Bourgeoisie' in Kenya" *Ufahamu* 9, no. 2 (1977): 86-118; and Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: Political Economy of Neocolonialism* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975). The debate has continued in the *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 17 (1980): 83-113; and in a series of papers presented at a "Conference on The African Bourgeoisie - The Development of Capitalism in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast," sponsored by the Joint Committee on African Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, Dakar, Senegal, December 2-4, 1980.

6. The Narodniks were nineteenth century utopian theorists who believed socialism in Russia could be based on the traditional "mir." Lenin attacked them for reactionary populism, which he saw as a defensive form of nationalism serving the interests of the small producer as opposed to either big capital or organized labour. He argued, however, that any attempt to implement Narodism would actually lead to the pauperization of the small producer, since it would attempt the impossible task of institutionalizing capitalism in its least developed and most backward form. For Lenin's critique applied to the Tanzanian "experiment" see Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania." For interesting critiques of current populisms see J.Y. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of the Urban Bias," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 6, no. 2 (1979): 24-214; Klaus Ernst, *Tradition and Progress in the African Village: The Non-Capitalist Transformation of Rural Communities in Mali* (London: Hurst and Company, 1973); and Utsa Patnaik, "Neo-Populist Marxism: The Chayanovian View of the Agrarian Question and Its Fundamental Fallacy," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 6, no. 4 (1979): 375-419. For a discussion of the Russian Narodniks themselves see the many volumes by V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works I-V* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) and one by Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution* (New York: Grosset, 1966).

and the numerous other terms⁷ devised to characterize this class are replete with political implications, but they do not answer this important question.⁸ Moving behind the terms, one is still faced with an enigma: a class which appears faceless, whose actions are often interpreted somewhat ahistorically,⁹ and whose dialectic remains elusive. These important gaps in our understanding cannot be surmounted and this class cannot be discussed empirically until more research is done. At present, it is impossible to say whether Tanzania's ruling class should be seen as a class of enrichers in Fanon's sense,¹⁰ whether it is instead a class attempting to transform itself into a proper *capitalist* class by using the state as its principal vehicle of accumulation, or whether it is something

7. The term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" was originally coined by Shivji, *Class Struggles*, 1976 and Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle," in *Socialism in Tanzania*, ed. Lionel Cliffe and John Saul (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), 2: 304-330. There is no attempt in this essay to reiterate or reanalyze previous discussions here. Readers interested in following the discussion to date should turn to the following: Shivji, *Class Struggles*, pp. 66-99; Geoffrey W. Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment and Dependence" (Paper No. 38, La Trobe Sociology Papers, La Trobe University, Bundora Victoria, Australia, September 1976); Michaela von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 20 and elsewhere in the text; collected essays by John Saul. *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979) pp. 167-297; Phil Raikes, *State and Agriculture in Tanzania*, Mimeographed, 1980, pp. 1.15-1.19 and Chapter 10; Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzania Version," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 8 (1977): 75-89. Wadada D. Nabudere, "Imperialism, State, Class and Race: A Critique of Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania*," *Maji Maji*, no. 27 (1976): 1-22; John Saul "The State in Post Colonial Societies: Tanzania," in *Socialist Register 1974*, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1974); K. Nsari, "Tanzania: Neo-Colonialism and the Struggle for National Liberation," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 4 (1975): 109-118; Ayoub Tabari, "Review of Freedom and Development by Julius K. Nyerere," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 3 (1975): 89-96; Walter Rodney, "Class Contradictions in Tanzania," *Pan-Africanist* (September, 1975): 15-29; Colin Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 8 (1977): 56-74; Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Bismark Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, ed., *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979). Part of the reason this class is so poorly understood is that academics took Tanzania's "socialism" seriously for some time. In addition, it is far more difficult to analyze classes in a situation in which the state denies their import.

8. This is not to suggest that terms like "nizers" and "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" were originally intended by the authors to answer this question. However, the fact that the content of these terms does not clarify the material basis of this class and its policy suggests that more work needs be done.

9. Shivji, *Class Struggles*, provides one of the few attempts to locate this class historically; even then, however, the descriptive content behind the generalizations is somewhat scanty and unsatisfying.

10. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 141.

else altogether. What can be done in *lieu* of further research and what this paper attempts to do is to synthesize the existing secondary material and to begin to analyze the historical origins of the Tanzanian state and its populist bureaucratic class.

This discussion of origins, while historical, has its theoretical implications concerning the development of capitalism. It departs from both bourgeois development literature and "dependencia" theorizing in the sense that it does not view third world states as neutral filters for international capital¹¹ either in an inherently positive or in an inherently negative sense.

It suggests instead the class character of the state is critical in explaining the emergence of different types of capitalist systems. Along with Kay and Warren,¹² it argues that capitalism has not matured uniformly, that where it has created underdevelopment it was never fully institutionalized and was therefore unable to transform the productivity of labour, and hence the value of labour power itself.¹³ Beyond this, the paper maintains that individual colonial states adopted different policies towards the development of capitalism and it is these earlier developments which set the stage for later disparities. In the case of Kenya and Tanzania, it is clear that the class character of the two independent states

11. For a more theoretical discussion of this point see Mueller, "Barriers to the Further Development." Furthermore although it is a current dependencia notion that the third world is a virtual tabula rasa for international capital, recent events in Tanzania belie that. See "'David' Nyerere takes on IMF Goliath," *New African* (January 1980): 33-35.

12. Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment*; Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review*, no. 81 (1973): 3-44.

13. This is Kay's argument in *Development and Underdevelopment*, p. 55. For inciteful discussion of how and why capitalism has matured differently in different places also see Warren, "Imperialism and Capital Industrialization;" Brenner, "Origins of Capitalist Development;" and Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for an Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?," *World Development*, no. 6 (1978): 881-924. Banaji has criticized the "articulations of the modes of production" approach for effectively reverting to dualism as have Cowen and by implication Mueller. See Banaji, "Modes of Production," p. 35; Cowen, NCCHP, p. 19; and Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism." For other discussions of the articulations approach see Colin Leys, "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7, no. 1 (1977): 92-107; Henry Bernstein, "Notes on Capital and the Peasantry," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 10 (1977): 60-73; and Bernstein's critique of Kay, *idem.*, "Underdevelopment and The Law of Value: A Critique of Kay," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 6 (1976): 51-64. For a more sympathetic treatment of the articulations approach for Tanzania see Deborah F. Bryceon, "Primitive Accumulation and Imperialism in Relation to the Reproduction of Third World Peasants" (Paper presented to the Southern African Universities Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, June 23-27, 1979); and Lionel Cliffe, "Rural Class Formation in East Africa," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 4, no. 2 (1977): 195-224.

mirrors that of their colonial predecessors in terms of policies and attitudes towards the development of capitalism. In contrast to Kenya,¹⁴ colonial policies in Tanzania acted to retard capitalist development by discouraging primitive accumulation, promoting smallholder agriculture, and by embarking on a series of decisions which made the emergence of an industrial capitalist state after independence unlikely.

The first part of the paper examines the historical antecedents of Tanzania's ruling class up to 1967, when Nyerere announced Tanzania's intention of pursuing a "socialist" alternative in the now famous Arusha Declaration.¹⁵ Much of this section is devoted to a discussion of policies adopted by the colonial state before independence in 1961 and the inherent contradiction of these policies from the standpoint of capitalist development. It analyses the colonial economy sector by sector and therefore departs from a strictly chronological history. The second part of the paper discusses the independence movement and the class content of the post-colonial state. It attempts to determine why Tanzania's ruling class acted to stifle the development of capitalism and why such a course may not have been inimical to its material interests. Given the absence of strong evidence, the conclusions reached in this section are necessarily more tentative.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Tanganyika's status as an international mandate and Britain's weakened position after World War I were historically critical. They jointly determined a series of policies which retarded capitalist development for most of the colonial period. Until the end of the war, Tanganyika was a German colony. She was then transferred to Great Britain, first as a

14. In his discussion of Kenya, Cowen has argued that international capital entered as finance industrial capital with a consequent propensity to extract by means of relative surplus value in contrast to the estate capital of a previous era which extracted by means of absolute surplus value. Cowen argues that international capital thereby came to extract by means of relative surplus value and in contrast to populist writers like Feder he shows how and why pauperization did not result. See Cowen "On Household Production" and Ernest Feder, "Capitalism's Last Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agriculture," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7, No. 1 (1977): 56-78.

15. The Arusha Declaration refers to policies which a) nationalized the commanding heights of the economy, b) set forth a policy of individual and national "self reliance" c) proposed an agrarian program based on communal production in "ujamaa" villages, and d) was followed by a leadership code which prohibited "anyone in a middle-or-senior-rank position in either government or the party" (Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 235.) from holding more than one job, engaging in business, having more than one house or renting property.

mandate¹⁶ under the League of Nations and later as a trusteeship under the United Nations. Economic dislocation was the immediate impact of the transfer from Germany. Britain's first priority was to re-establish political order in the colony. Initially, the colonial state was forced to deal with a whole range of matters, including the transfer of German property, revamping the colonial administrative apparatus, and normalizing relations with Germany, a task which was not completed until 1925.¹⁷ Consequently, economic concerns were postponed. A rather immediate indication of the economic disruption created by this change in imperial authority and the inevitable postponement was the precipitous drop in exports from Tanganyika, with the 1912 level of trade not being matched again until 1924.¹⁸ Shortly afterwards, the depression set in, export prices collapsed, and there were no significant development projects initiated in Tanganyika for over ten years.¹⁹ The nineteen twenties and early nineteen thirties brought with them designs to encourage settler plantation agriculture, particularly in sisal. By comparison with other colonies the overall effort was trivial and hindered almost immediately both by the depression and the onset of World War II. However, economic dislocation and the war were only one set of factors which put a curb on development in Tanganyika.

The future of capitalism in Tanganyika was also affected adversely by Tanganyika's belated entry into the British orbit. By the time of the transfer from Germany, Britain's empire was already large and the metropole was forced to be more selective about financial ventures in the colonies.²⁰ Consequently, Britain was unwilling to invest heavily in Tanganyika, which had the related effect of making it difficult to attract the kind of capital which could have helped to promote full fledged capitalist development. The policies adopted by the colonial state in

16. In theory, a whole series of regulations under the mandate made development along the Kenyan lines unlikely as there were restrictions on land alienation and infringing the rights of the local inhabitants. Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York: MacMillan, 1928), 1:432. However as John Iliffe notes, "Generally the mandate was an old-fashioned document embodying pre-war safeguards against colonial abuses but containing no provision for enforcement against a recalcitrant mandatory." *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 247.

17. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 303.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 26. Also "Tanganyika had been Germany's most valued colony. The British wanted only to deny it to others... Of course even Britain's waning economic vigour could have transformed Tanganyika had the territory possessed any economic attraction." *Ibid.*, p. 261.

Tanganyika reflected these economic constraints. Although the colonial state encouraged and actively insisted upon increased peasant commodity production for export, it effectively discouraged capitalist relations of production or the conditions which would prompt such relations. As an adjunct to its impoverished material base, the state also developed a paternalistic ideology of indirect rule. This ideology worked to justify a policy which discouraged industrialization, freehold tenure in land, proletarianization, and the creation of a middle class:²¹ in short, the patterns normally associated with classic capitalist development. In discussing the reasons for the adoption of such a policy, Brett notes:

[There were] difficulties involved in creating an even marginally successful settler sector in Kenya in competition with the potential for peasant production inside the territory and with other export oriented settler economies in the rest of the world. [These difficulties] suggested that given the conditions of the time, peasant development [in Tanganyika] was far easier and if the word can be used more "natural" than the creation of a settler colony. The latter required massive administrative and economic injections on behalf of an economic structure which found it very difficult to compete effectively on world markets. The African peasantry, on the other hand, requiring very little in the way of capital and being prepared to work long hours for small returns, provided a valid base on which to establish and maintain the modest administrative and commercial superstructure which British colonialism imposed. Once the fundamental decisions had been taken to prefer this system, the policy tended to operate in a relatively untroubled environment - the increased conflicts which characterized the whole process of change in Kenya were eliminated and administration was brought under very little direct pressure from groups inside or outside the territory.²²

However, even before this policy had really solidified, capitalist development was already hamstrung by Tanganyika's status as an international mandate. The terms of the mandate, which were designed to protect the local population by prohibiting the separation of land and labour, also worked to discourage capital accumulation and the emergence of a proletariat.²³ At one level, the document could in fact be read as an anti-capitalist manifesto. Beyond this, the mandate also inhibited private investment because of the ambiguity it created regarding Britain's relationship with Tanganyika. On this point, Buell argues:

21. Ideologically, the Tanganyikan colonial state might be said to be the antecedent to the "small is beautiful" philosophy. Although some of these same sentiments were voiced by the colonial state in Kenya, they were counteracted by policy due to settler presence. This point is discussed in greater detail below.

22. E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), pp. 217-218.

23. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, pp. 429-430.

As in the Camerouns, many traders, having heard only vaguely of the general principles of the mandate system, believed that the British Government could administer the territory only for a term of years, and that it could be taken away from the government by the League of Nations. Consequently, a general uneasiness arose which, according to officials and businessmen, hindered investment of capital in the territory.²⁴

Apart from the mandate document itself, there was a real and seemingly endless uncertainty surrounding Tanganyika's future, an uncertainty which was dramatically accentuated by the depression and World War II. As early as the interwar years Britain felt insecure concerning her hold over Tanganyika. German imperialists continued to clamour for Tanganyika's return and with the onset of the war, its return became a real possibility which further deterred business investment.²⁵ A further indication of Britain's somewhat ambiguous status in the territory was that the lion's share of Tanganyika's trade continued to be directed to continental Europe rather than to Great Britain during this period.²⁶ The immediate effect of the mandate was to place Tanganyika "at the bottom of the imperial pecking order."²⁷ It had much lower priority than Kenya and was never particularly significant from either an African or a global perspective.²⁸ Its longer term impact was the "continuing poverty" which later became "British Tanganyika's leading characteristic."²⁹

Tanganyika's belated status as a British Protectorate, the terms of the mandate itself, and the uncertainty regarding her future, all discouraged European settlement. Ironically it was the absence of a strong settler population in Tanganyika which adversely affected capitalist development there. In conjunction with other tendencies, this absence effectively opened the way for the "liberal" policies of the colonial state which were hostile to primitive accumulation, capital accumulation, and industrialisation, policies which were in fact antagonistic to capitalist development.

Initially, the British colonial state was simply not in an administrative position to encourage European settlement. Later, "the depression ended [any] prospects of a viable expatriate sector on the land," "while the possibility that the territory might be transferred to Germany inhibited growth after 1936."³⁰ By the end of World War II, when Britain's grasp

24. *Ibid.*, p. 432.

25. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 302; Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, pp. 116, 231. However as Iliffe indicates, international capital was not particularly interested in any case, perhaps because of Kenya's lead.

26. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 301, 304.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

28. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*.

29. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 261.

30. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 231.

over Tanganyika was firm, settler colonies were viewed as expensive, troublesome propositions. Furthermore, Kenya already had a "primus inter pares" status within the East African imperial framework. The most important result was that European settlement never became official colonial policy in Tanganyika;³¹ the official policy ranged haphazardly from active discouragement to only mild encouragement.³² With some variations,³³ the basic thrust of this anti-settler policy continued throughout the period of British colonialism.

From the standpoint of capitalist development, the weakness of the settler population was important. It permitted the British colonial state to adopt policies which not only braked settler immigration, but which were also hostile to land alienation and hence to capital accumulation. In 1921, in conjunction with the terms of the mandate, the colonial government declared Tanganyika to be "primarily a black man's country" and a law was soon introduced to protect African customary tenure.³⁴ The immediate effect of the law was to discourage primitive accumulation either by Europeans or by Africans.³⁵ Following the deportation of German settlers between 1917 and 1924, settler land was bought up by indigenous Asians and Europeans with further alienation severely restricted and then only to demarcated areas. Along with the German exodus, insufficient labour discouraged further European settlement and by 1921, there were only 2,447 settlers in comparison with the 4,998 of 1913.³⁶ The numbers picked up gradually, reaching 8,200 by 1913,³⁷ growing again from 9,345 to 10,648 between 1938 and 1948, and increasing to 20,598 by 1958.³⁸ Finally, by 1961, there were 22,000 Europeans in Tanganyika (British

31. Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 16.

32. Hostility to the idea of turning Tanganyika into a settler colony actually predated British entry and was introduced under German rule. An early German Governor, Rechenberg, said that "the supply of raw materials to Germany (was) the object. . . and whether it (was) achieved through plantation agriculture or native cultivation (was) a secondary consideration." Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 154. Rechenberg prohibited anything beyond an initial alienation of land by German settlers and refused to keep Africans from planting coffee in competition with Europeans (*Ibid.*, p. 144).

33. One of the principal variations was that Tanganyika was not a colony of small European settlers like Kenya and a number of issues simply didn't arise because Africans in Tanganyika did not have the capital to compete with sisal plantations and hence did not grow it.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

35. Although the equivalent of freehold tenure of land did develop in some areas, principally in the Kilimanjaro area, it was not legally underwritten and eventually adversely affected the development of a kulak class.

36. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 303-304.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 373.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

Information Services, 1961: 2), but as of 1957, 89% of them were not landed settlers, but employees of foreign firms.³⁹

Aside from the problem of sheer numbers, Britain's settler policy also suffered from constant ambiguity; when the colonial state was theoretically encouraging settlers, often it appeared to be doing the reverse. In Tanganyika, unlike Kenya, Britain didn't encourage new immigrants with aid or technical assistance, but was still anxious to increase its presence to counteract German influence.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, many parts of Tanganyika were declared "unsuitable" for European settlement and those with potential sometimes had inadequate support services.⁴¹ A further source of ambiguity was the overtly hostile attitude of Tanganyika's early British Governors towards European settlers. While at one level this attitude appeared to be a fortuitous congruence with decisions reflecting objective material conditions in the metropole, at another level it was nonetheless a partial contradiction. Begrudgingly conceding the need for some settlers in the late nineteen twenties, Governor Cameron was adamant in insisting that at least they should be "men of means, otherwise they would need government subsidies."⁴² Cameron's views became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The half-hearted attempt to settle ex-servicemen of lesser means after World War II failed. It proved too arduous for them and they were forced to return to Britain.⁴³

The general lack of support in encouraging European settlement was also reflected in the colonial state's unwillingness to prohibit Africans from growing crops which were also produced by Europeans. This issue finally came to a head in the 1920s. Frustrated by the competition from Chagga coffee growers and the difficulties of obtaining labour, Europeans in the Kilimanjaro Region sought unsuccessfully to have the area transferred to Kenya.⁴⁴ Still later, they again launched another unsuccessful movement, this time for a "closer union with Uganda and Kenya."⁴⁵ These failures were in turn indicative of the weakness of Tanganyika's settlers, a weakness which also had adverse consequences for capitalist development in the colony.

39. *Ibid.*, and Edmund W. Clark, *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania 1964-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 38.

40. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 373. "In view of the mandate, German settlement, and the official view that Tanganyika must be predominantly an African territory, government gave less indirect aid to settlement." *Ibid.*, p. 303. The view must be qualified, settlers who stayed eventually did get state aid indirectly through credit and other services.

41. Clark, *Socialist Development*, p. 66.

42. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 226.

43. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 4.11.

44. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 276.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 321.

From the standpoint of capitalist development, the absence of a strong settler population in Tanganyika created a vicious circle which fed on earlier tendencies to deter both an influx of private capital and a heavy outlay of British state capital for development. The weakness of Tanganyika's settlers also negatively affected the development of industrial capital, the linchpin of classic capitalist development. One of the many factors which discouraged industrialization in Tanganyika was the failure of its European population to act as a "well established pressure group,"⁴⁶ a fact which contrasted starkly with the Kenyan situation. Kenya's settlers were, above all, "economic nationalists."⁴⁷ They engineered successfully - and sometimes against the colonial state - for land, labour and perhaps most importantly, industrialization.⁴⁸ As Brett notes:

The difference [between Kenya and Tanganyika] can be attributed directly to the presence there of the settler community, with its strong political position and its commitment to a limited form of economic nationalism, as well as to the destabilizing effects of the settler economy upon the local society. The settlers, although initially an exclusively agricultural community, accepted the need to industrialize partly in order to provide more secure markets for local agricultural products, partly out of desire to see a viable modern economic system established on the lines of the others underway in the white Dominions. Equally important, their presence had the effect of breaking down the self-sufficiency of the African economic systems based on indirect rule. In the Kenyan case this had become evident by the mid-thirties... taking the form of apparent rural impoverishment through overcrowding and worklessness. In such circumstances the administration was able to jettison any hopes of saving 'traditional man' from the demoralizing effects of factory labour much more rapidly than was the case in peasant economies.⁴⁹

In Tanganyika, the combined effect of the entire colonial settler policy worked against settler nationalism and hence did not invite a settler industrial strategy of the Kenyan sort. In contrast to Kenya, Tanganyika's European settlers were relatively few, of mixed nationalities,⁵⁰ far from the administrative hub of Dar es Salaam, and generally isolated from each other.⁵¹ British settlers barely dominated the colony numerically and

46. Justinian Rweyemamu: *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 116.

47. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 77.

48. "They were willing and able to press for policies committed to building up internal rather than export markets and even for protection for industrialization despite what they saw to be the opposition of British manufacturing interests." *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78. Kenya settlers often saw themselves as antagonists, not allies, of the colonial state.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

50. "By 1938, the European community was 9,345. Only 4,054 were British and 3,205 were German." *Ibid.*, p. 221.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

had only the slimmest of leads over German settlers.⁵² This created problems for Great Britain and for settler capitalism as Britain was theoretically prohibited from favouring her own nationals under the terms of the international mandate. This diversity and isolation among Tanganyika's settlers, and their lack of state support, meant that, unlike their Kenya counterparts, they did not organize politically until very late in the colonial period and they were never able to act as a "cohesive force."⁵³ This political weakness displayed by Tanganyika's settlers partially reflected their economic position in the colony. Unlike Kenya's settlers, they commanded a much smaller portion of the best land and "their contribution to the export economy (while) always significant, (was) never...overwhelming."⁵⁴

The overall result was that neither primitive accumulation nor industrialization of the Kenyan variety occurred in Tanganyika. What this indicated was that Tanganyika was going to be a colony on the cheap. It was designed to extract revenues through the expansion of household commodity production rather than through any radical transformation in either the social relations of production or the development of the productive forces. The plantation sector continued to be small throughout the colonial period. The size and influence of the settler population as well as the inducements offered by Great Britain were not significant enough to interest a large flow of either settler or international capital. Industrial development was also almost non-existent, in part because of the proximity and greater attractiveness of Kenya. Tanganyika then was a classic example of what Kay meant when he said "capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough."⁵⁵

From the standpoint of industrialization, the adverse effects of Britain's overall Tanganyikan policy were apparent early on. By the late nineteen thirties, Kenya already had an established industrial base. It was stimulated by "the shortages of manufactures during World War II,"⁵⁶ and effectively protected by the East African Common Market, which Tan-

52. Of the 1666 people holding long term leases in Tanganyika only 480 (28.8%) were British. Clark, *Socialist Development*, p. 33; and Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 222.

53. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 116. Also, in many cases the Tanganyika settlers were far from wealthy; Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 347.

54. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 222. Also, Clark, *Socialist Development*, p. 38.

55. Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment*, p. 55 and pp. 96-156. For comments on Kay see Bernstein, "Underdevelopment and the Law of Value," pp. 51-64.

56. Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 23.

ganyika had joined in the mid nineteen twenties. The common customs and transport policies operated as protectionist devices, which turned Tanganyika into a dumping ground for Kenyan goods. Most of Tanganyika's trade went through Kenya's ports⁵⁷ and by the nineteen thirties she had an unfavourable balance of trade within the common market that continued after independence.⁵⁸ Prior to any long term clarification concerning Tanganyika's colonial status, industry went to Kenya. Subsequently, "centripetal pressures converg(ed) on Kenya"⁵⁹ and "Tanganyika scarcely felt the post-war industrialization taking place in Kenya and Uganda."⁶⁰ Few industries invested in Tanganyika before 1940, with the pattern continuing still later.⁶¹ Those which did, concentrated in the urban areas, employing a miniscule portion of the population whose needs were easily serviced by imports from Kenya.⁶² Consequently, a sophisticated proletarianized work force did not develop and as a reflection of this impoverished manufacturing base, the state emphasized clerical over industrial training.⁶³ By 1961, manufacturing represented only 3% of Tanganyika's GDP in contrast to Kenya's 10%.⁶⁴ Even the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which provided imperial funds for long term stable growth in preparation for eventual independence, did not alter the basic structure of Tanganyika's economy. Infrastructure and public works were emphasized in contrast to productive enterprises.⁶⁵ The results were unimpressive⁶⁶ and "(in) Dar es Salaam, the ... (new Development) Act scarcely ruffled the leaves in Acacia Avenue."⁶⁷

The confluence of material conditions in Great Britain and Tanganyika, which eventually matured to a policy of anti-industrialization, was buttressed by the colonial administration's paternalistic, anti-capitalist ideological pronouncements. Ideologically, these pronouncements were in many respects the historical antecedents of "dependencia" theorizing

57. Clark, *Socialist Development*, p. 33.

58. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, pp. 104-105; Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, pp. 116-119.

59. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 116.

60. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 471.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 447.

62. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 276.

63. Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 23.

64. There is some dispute on the Tanganyika figures. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 447; and Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 20 put the figure at 5 percent.

65. Iliffe notes that the colonial administration emphasized political development and infrastructure instead of cash crops, official ideology notwithstanding. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 229.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 437-50.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 438.

and Nyerere's brand of Narodnik "socialism." From the perspective of the times, they were part of a superstructure which justified the development of a primary producing enclave economy based on the expansion rather than the displacement of household commodity production, the extraction of absolute as opposed to relative surplus value and the attenuation of class formation. Cameron and Byatt, two of Tanganyika's early British Governors, made numerous statements concerning the evil effects of capitalism on the African population. Cameron (who had been trained by Lugard in Nigeria) believed that, "It is our duty... to do everything in our power to develop the native on lines which will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European."⁶⁸ On the other hand, the colonial administration was also disgusted by the "extravagance" of Haya chiefs whose largesse was based on pre-capitalist feudal relations and proceeded in 1925 to "free the tenants from tributary labour."⁶⁹ The same administration made its feelings quite clear; it felt that "a capitalist community" "amongst natives is to be deprecated,"⁷⁰ and recommended an African curriculum in the schools (perhaps the forerunner of Nyerere's "education for self-reliance"). Above all, its pronouncements suggested that it was in favour of preserving the "natural African" and that it viewed urbanization as "alien and dangerous."⁷¹ Nevertheless, at both the ideological and material level, it was a policy racked by contradictions. Notwithstanding early official ideological pronouncements concerning the encouragement of household community production, one of Tanganyika's first British Governors, Cameron, made political rather than economic matters his foremost concern. The nineteen twenties were thereby spent developing a completely new administrative apparatus from scratch, institutionalizing "indirect rule," and creating an entirely new "native authority system."⁷² Consequently, the colonial state paid little attention to the development of cash cropping by Africans during this period with increases in agricultural production explained largely by higher producer prices.⁷³ Once economic matters did become a concern, the contradictions of the colonial state's ideology and its strategy for capitalist development were also apparent. As Iliffe has noted, "peasants were encouraged to grow coffee, but coffee

68. *Ibid.*, p. 321.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 473.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 326. This hostility to capitalism and the policy of "indirect rule paternalism" was perhaps best epitomized by Governor Byatt's unwillingness even to meet the representative of the European plantation industry. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 223.

72. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 49.

73. John Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika. Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 10* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), p. 19.

farmers were (perceived of as) 'swollen headed' and subversive."⁷⁴

In spite of the continued production from European sisal plantations in the nineteen thirties, the policy of expanding smallholder agriculture among Africans continued, with the "economic base" of the colony in the "peasant sector"⁷⁵ rather than in "small scale European" settlement along the Kenya lines.⁷⁶ Throughout the colonial period, it was a policy which could not escape the contradiction of promoting change while clamping down on transformation. It is these contradictions and their results which help to explain the class character of the post-colonial state and why a Narodnik type of populism became the Tanzanian way.⁷⁷ The contradictions themselves stem from changing policies on land, labour, and the creation of a capitalist middle class. On the one hand, Europeans in Tanganyika alienated less than 1% of the land,⁷⁸ few restrictions were placed on what Africans were allowed to grow, and the official policy was to promote cash cropping by peasant producers. Furthermore, proletarianization was minimal by comparison with Kenya, where the imposition of settler agriculture often necessitated separating the producer from his means of production, resulting in landlessness.⁷⁹ At the level of appearances and reality, the policies seemed and often were more "liberal" than those across the border.⁸⁰ On the other hand, these same policies were fraught with disaster. Until very late, they were inherently designed to expand commodity production without inducing capitalist relations of

74. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 326.

75. "Initially, it was not colonialism, but the nineteenth century Zanzibar plantation economy which provided the stimulus for long distance trade, specialization and exchange with the Tanganyika mainland interior, the introduction of new crops, and population growth." Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, pp. 1-11. African societies were extremely numerous and varied ranging from stateless to feudal. The imposition of German rule, with relatively little land alienated for settlers, did not displace smallholder African production. Labour was secured by migration or through forced contract labour. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 153-159. German settler capital was in general extremely impoverished, with reliance on force, poor wages, and horrid conditions that ultimately led to the spread of disease, famine, rebellion, and in some cases to the scattering of populations. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-203; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*, p. 12.

76. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 232.

77. The word "help" is used here because the independent ruling class is a class with its own interests and not simply a reflection of the colonial past.

78. The land survey precluded alienation where there were more than two African families per square mile. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 227.

79. Proletarianization was not uniform in Kenya. Areas which had escaped primitive accumulation and/or areas in which merchant capital dominated were more receptive to petit-bourgeois politics in the post-independence periods, although such an explanation does not do justice to the complexities of the period.

80. This is because in Kenya (as elsewhere) the act of primitive accumulation is a bloody process.

production, without developing the productive forces, and hence without altering value of labour power.

In the first instance, colonial land policy stunted the development of rural capitalism.⁸¹ For most of the colonial period, the state insisted on "native customary tenure,"⁸² refused to allow freehold title deeds and in 1946 adopted a policy of "retain(ing) ultimate control of all land."⁸³ The implications were well appreciated by rich Chagga farmers, who tried unsuccessfully to convince the colonial government that the buying and selling of land and title deeds as "traditional."⁸⁴ Although the agglomeration of land continued so did fragmentation on the basis of traditional rights. The concentration of land was sometimes based on precapitalist relations which were often exploited by chiefs.⁸⁵ When it was based on commodity relations, it was sometimes disguised as "pre-capitalist" to avoid interference by the state.⁸⁶ Furthermore, in an area like Ismani, the lack of legal rights to land, meant that capitalist farmers were sometimes more interested in quick profits than in farming practices which would maintain the fertility of the soil.⁸⁷ While in other areas, farmers "feared that rehabilitation might lead to the loss of land to Europeans."⁸⁸ The overall result of attempting to cement "tradition" amidst change was to stymie the development of a class of rural capitalists by keeping it small, insecure, undercapitalized and thereby retarding accumulation. This in turn inhibited the formation and organization of rural wage labour.

The policy of promoting smallholder production while discouraging primitive accumulation by either Europeans or Africans was full of other

81. Many of the policies described, including lack of title and lack of encouragement in the way of credit, etc., were also characteristic of the Kenyan period. However, the policies of land alienation and industrialization as well as differences in class formation gave rise to a different set of historical circumstances discussed below. Also, Kenya's settlers acted as a pressure group in the colonial state, attenuating the paternalism of indirect rule which characterized Tanzania.

82. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 38.

83. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 451.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 461-462; Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 27; Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 26; Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 21.

86. Adhu Awiti, "Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism" in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Lionel Cliffe, *et. al.* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), p. 68. One difficulty with the articulation of the modes of production model is that it cannot account for this masking, which is in fact necessitated by the state and does not represent another mode of production. It represents the authority of capital attenuated by the state, and not a separate "pre-capitalist" mode of production.

87. Awiti, "Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism" in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe *et. al.*, p. 54.

88. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 36.

contradictions.⁸⁹ These contradictions eventually destroyed “traditional” agriculture without transforming it. It was official policy to expand cash crop production by household producers, but Africans received little in the way of good scientific advice and the policy was half-hearted at best. The colonial state was allegedly dedicated to smallholders. Nevertheless, when Europeans complained about competition from African coffee growers in the Kilimanjaro area, the state adopted an ambiguous policy of “non-encouragement without prohibition.”⁹⁰ Agricultural credit was also not available for Africans until very late in the colonial period.⁹¹ The official reason given for the policy of denial was the circular argument that Africans did not have title to their land and could not offer security. With the exception of occasional advice by missions and improved seeds offered by Europeans, little was done systematically to develop African agriculture.⁹² This neglect was itself a partial contradiction at the ideological level. It combined with extensive production of the land and the depression to produce material contradictions of landlessness,⁹³ overpopulation, erosion, famine, and falling producer prices that bore witness to the crisis in African agriculture between 1929 and 1945.⁹⁴ The colonial state’s initial response was a policy which relied heavily on coercion by Native Authorities to enforce minimum acreage requirements, as well as compulsory regulations concerning destocking and terracing. It was also designed to increase revenues from Tanganyika to help alleviate Britain’s depressed economy and outstanding war debts.⁹⁵ The results of compulsion were often disastrous,⁹⁶ but African cash crop production nevertheless began to pick up in the late nineteen forties and nineteen fifties, again primarily in response to increased producer prices.⁹⁷

89. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 451.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

91. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, pp. 1.20-1.23.

92. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 229; Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, pp. 4.1-9.1; Andrew Coulson, “Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania,” *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 10 (1977): 74-100.

93. The degree of landlessness varied, but was relatively minor by comparison with Kenya.

94. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 346-380.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 436.

96. Tanganyika’s disastrous Groundnut Scheme, designed to alleviate Britain’s shortage in edible oils, was a product of this period. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 476. In general, the agricultural advice was often incorrect (Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, devotes a good part of his manuscript to this tendency in both the pre- and post-independence period) and the approach essentially attempted “to solve problems without altering the basic forces which had brought them into existence;” that is “the growing shortage of land owing to population growth and cash cropping without major technological change...” Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 36.

97. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, pp. 4.7-4.10.

Finally, the colonial state's overall failures in developing smallholder production, plus political exigencies in the nineteen fifties, led to the ultimate contradiction of dismantling the policy itself. Faced with "mau mau" across the border, Britain wanted to insure a stable middle class in the transition to independence. She decided on a policy of "colour blind capitalism"⁹⁸ to support "progressive farmers" "by encouraging the replacement of customary land tenure by individual freehold"⁹⁹ and by selectively supplying Africans with credit. However, it was a policy that could at best be described as too little too late and the legacies of the independent state remained with the earlier period. In Kenya, nationalists spent years fighting for the right to title deeds,¹⁰⁰ whereas in Tanganyika they argued against it and immediately challenged this change in colonial land policy. The challenge itself is not well understood. It may have reflected the dominant class interests of the nationalist movement itself and its attempt to solidify its mass base. Moreover, the change may have been viewed as a means by which Europeans and Asians would attempt to consolidate their interests or as the beginning of a masterplan proposal for "multi-racialism."¹⁰¹ Whatever the reasons, Nyerere used the opposition to the new colonial land policy to consolidate political support for the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1958, claiming:

If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika.... We would be faced with a problem which has created antagonism among people and led to bloodshed in many countries of the world.¹⁰²

In adopting such a course of action, the nationalist movement was not simply challenging colonial policy. At a deeper level, it was opposing the mainstays of capitalism: primitive accumulation, which Marx viewed as the essential starting point of capitalist development and capitalist accumulation which Marx regarded as necessary to its survival and transformation.

In a number of other respects, the colonial government's new "focal point" approach, which aimed to create a "progressive" class, could not so quickly dismantle old patterns. Specifically, it could not escape the contradictions of a previous forty years which had neglected industrialization and set in motion its own form of regional specialization and rural differentiation which stunted the development of both a rural proletariat

98. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 553.

99. *Idem.*, *Agricultural Change*, p. 37.

100. Njonjo, "The Africanization of the White Highlands," Chaps. II and VII.

101. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 28-31, pp. 38-42.

102. Julius Nyerere quoted in Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 38.

and a rural bourgeoisie. The contradictions which had been established were numerous.

In the first instance, the middle class, the historical bulwark of capitalist development, was small and poorly trained in Tanganyika. Given the low level of investment by international capital and the consequent lack of industrialization, there had been little need for a large number of educated Africans prior to the nineteen fifties. As Brett has noted, "colonial policy in Tanganyika tended to discourage forms of economic change which might lead the African population off the land into secondary and tertiary economic activities."¹⁰³ The opposite was true in Kenya. And furthermore, with all the restrictions facing that emerging bourgeoisie, there were simply more opportunities to interject into the pores of capitalist society.¹⁰⁴ Although Tanganyika experienced some minor industrialization in the late nineteen forties with the setting up of the brewery, coke and flour millers industries among others, the structure of the economy was not transformed.¹⁰⁵ The capital of Dar es Salaam remained small, holding only 129,000 out of a total population of 9 million by 1957.¹⁰⁶ Only 4% of the total population was in the cities and of those who were the 32% wage earners,¹⁰⁷ the majority were employed in agriculture or the public service, with less than half as many individuals in the private non-agricultural sector as in neighbouring Kenya.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, in spite of Britain's belated change in policy concerning the creation of a "progressive" capitalist class, both the educated middle class and the urban working class continued to be extremely small and their experience limited. In 1961, there were only 150 university graduates and 176 secondary students.¹⁰⁹ The upper reaches of

103. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, p. 276.

104. Although Kenya's nascent big bourgeoisie found its operation circumscribed by the colonial state, capital invested did create more opportunities to accumulate through trade and distributorships. On this point see Swainson, *Corporate Capitalism*; and Njonjo, "The Africanization of the White Highlands."

105. Clark, *Socialist Development*, p. 32; Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 447.

106. Tanganyika: The Making of a Nation. I.D. 1386. (New York: British Information Services, August 1961), p. 2.

107. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 21.

108. Clark, *Socialist Development*, pp. 36-37.

109. Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 27.

the civil service reflected the same tendencies, with one African in a senior post in 1951, 155 in 1957, and only 346 by 1960.¹¹⁰

The small size of the formal wage earning class¹¹¹ was the other half of this too little too late policy, which was attempting to institutionalize a "progressive" middle class. Its smallness was the offspring of a colonialism which had insisted on cash crop production, but actively fettered full fledged proletarianization.¹¹² Its smallness symptomized the continued aggregation of production for consumption and exchange at the level of the household. In agreeing to grant freehold tenure in the mid nineteen fifties, the colonial state finally acknowledged that "widespread landlessness" would have to be accepted.¹¹³ However, the lack of a strong settler and industrial base in Tanganyika continued to exert its influence. It meant that fewer wage labourers were needed and by and large¹¹⁴ they could be obtained through migration or in conjunction with household production, solutions that did not necessitate separating producers from their means of subsistence.¹¹⁵

The effect of colonial development policy was that certain parts of the country migrant labour reserves, while maintaining the peasantry's tie to the land, thereby aborted the emergence of a rural proletariat. From the standpoint of labour, the result was that migration was not "a pattern of life," but rather "an incident in a man's life."¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, it was a disruptive pattern which contributed to the backwardness of certain areas by continuously withdrawing labour at peak periods and by

110. *Tanganyika: The Making of a Nation*, p. 34. Other figures though compiled somewhat differently reflect the same general trend. In 1960, Africans held 28 out of 245 posts in the army, in 1961 there were no African Provincial Commissioners, and only 2 out of 57 District Commissioners. Of senior and middle grade posts in the civil service, Africans occupied 1,170 out of 4,452. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 573. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 92, has somewhat different figures which reflect the same tendencies.

111. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 21.

112. Henry Mapolu, "The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania" (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Paper 76.3, March 1976); Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 27; Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, pp. 3.10-3.11.

113. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 38.

114. Although conscription and taxation were used as means of obtaining African labour, European settlers were constantly complaining of inadequate labour supplies and resentful of the competition from African smallholders. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 372, 306; Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, pp. 17-23.

115. This also has the effect of reducing the size and strength of the organized working class.

116. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 17.

retarding the development of commodity relations in general. The overall impact of these differing patterns was at best mixed in that:

no African society in Tanganyika was proletarianized by the plantation economy during the colonial period... No Tanganyikan society lost its economic independence in the sense that the Kikuyu did in Kenya or the Sotho in Southern Africa.¹¹⁷

The other half of the picture was that capitalism could only be institutionalized in its most backward form as the emergence of a proletariat was fettered. In addition to the colonial state's land policy, the regional character of its development policy also contributed to this fettering. In Tanganyika, productive agricultural land was mostly on the rim of the country looking outward toward Kenya and Uganda. It was these areas which had attracted settlers and were comparatively well served by transport and marketing facilities, unlike the drier interior. It was here on the periphery and in other highland areas, in places like Ismani, Mbulu, Kilimanjaro, and Lushoto, that Africans began to produce cash crops alongside European estates.¹¹⁸ When no suitable cash crop could be found or when poor infrastructural development made marketing too costly, other areas including Kigoma, Songea and Mtwara turned into migrant labour reserves. They grew to service both expatriate and indigenous producers in the richer less arid parts of the country.¹¹⁹ Some of these reserve regions were eventually able to commercialize their agriculture when other factors such as favourable prices and the post-World War II "cash crop boom" made it profitable.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, migrant labour remained the dominant pattern even following the introduction of the "focal point" approach of the nineteen fifties. The approach itself in fact was not designed to disrupt this pattern. Migrant labour continued to be wed to smallholder agriculture thereby perpetuating a mass of unskilled labour with low productivity¹²¹ and precluding any transformation in the value of labour power. The result was that a "vicious circle was built up with poverty compelling migration and migration in turn hindering the alleviation of poverty."¹²² From the

117. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

118. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 274-305.

119. J. Wayne, "The Development of Backwardness in Kigoma Region," in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe *et al.*, pp. 131-144; *idem.*, "State and Economy in Colonial Tanganyika," Mimeographed, n.d.

120. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 454; *idem.*, *Agricultural Change*, p. 17.

121. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 23.

122. *Ibid.*, Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p. 17. Migrant smallholders attempted to compensate for low wages by expanding the production of cash crops, while simultaneously producing for consumption. This produced extensive rather than intensive cultivation, and no technical transformation. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 23.

standpoint of rural labour, the effect of its tie to the land coupled with migration was that capitalism was retarded and rural poverty became endemic. As Lenin had noted some years earlier discussing a similar situation elsewhere:

But where is the superiority of the tie with the land, if the market already so dominates the whole of the country's ... life that it discounts this tie by lowering the earnings of the agriculturalist.¹²³

There is no need to say more about the enormous significance ... of the "power of the soil"... We need only recall what a tremendous factor low earnings are in retarding the use of machinery and lowering the workers standard of living.¹²⁴

The nineteen fifties policy of supporting "progressive" farmers was also unable to surmount the past. It came too late to dismantle completely the earlier policies of the colonial state which had in fact discouraged the development of a rural bourgeoisie. Pre-capitalist relations and organizations of production were sometimes perpetuated rather than dismantled, thereby hindering also the development of rural capitalism.

In certain scattered advanced areas on the periphery, small groups of rich peasants had started to emerge even before the war.¹²⁵ By independence, they were already beginning to reinvest their accumulated capital in transport, small businesses, and real estate. Although the price boom of the nineteen fifties plus the colonial state's attention to "progressive" farmers further expanded their capital and opportunities, these capitalists generally pre-dated the change in policy. The Chagga had established a land market as early as the nineteen twenties. They had formed their own marketing organization and continued to buy and sell land in spite of the colonial state's opposition.¹²⁶ In other areas, including the Usambaras, landlessness was not uncommon.¹²⁷ Furthermore, although they did not have access to rural credit initially, many farmers nevertheless managed to accumulate capital which they began to plow back into farming. It came from their work in urban trade, as lorry drivers, cattle buyers, shopkeepers, government clerks, and mechanics.¹²⁸ In some places, the

123. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 2:400.

124. *Ibid.*, 2:393.

125. Awiti, "Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism" in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe, *et al.*, pp. 51-78; P.R. Lawrence, "Plantation Sisal: The Inherited Mode of Production" in *Rural Cooperation*, ed. Lionel Cliffe, *et al.*, pp. 103-130; Marjorie Mbilinyi, "The Transition to Capitalism in Rural Tanzania" (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Paper 74.7, November 1974); Shivji, *Class Struggles*.

126. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 274.

127. *Ibid.*, pp. 458-459; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*.

128. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 453; Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 17.

results were large holdings, mechanization, and impressive tractor hire schemes.¹²⁹ From this perspective, capitalist development seemed to be moving along quite unabated.

But capitalism did not always develop "along classical lines."¹³⁰ Sometimes land and labour were obtained, kept and recruited on the basis of pre-capitalist relations.¹³¹ Food crops were grown before cash crops, a very small percentage of what was produced was sold,¹³² there was little change in the techniques of production with the exception of the few "tractor farmers," the circulation of commodities was poor, and "few farmers were earning incomes which would match those of the tiny urban middle class."¹³³ The "focal point" approach of the nineteen fifties did not dismantle the dominant feature of the earlier colonial agrarian policy; smallholder production on less than two hectares of land continued to dominate the landscape.¹³⁴ One result was that primitive accumulation and the emergence of a capitalist class were retarded. From a somewhat longer term perspective, the results were ominous. As scientific agriculture began to mature, the so-called "subsistence economy" was under more and more strain and gradually began to break down.¹³⁵ The majority of the rural population increasingly consisted of a

129. Awiti in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe, et.al.; P. Raikes, "Wheat Production and the Development of Capitalism in North Iraqw," in *Ibid.*, pp. 79-102; Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 453; Rayah Feldman, "Social Differentiation and Political Goals in Tanzania," in *Beyond The Sociology of Development*, ed. Ivan Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth (London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul, 1975), pp. 158-170.

130. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 463.

131. *Ibid.*, pp. 458-468; Reeves, "Tanzanian Underdevelopment," p. 26; J. Boesen, B.S. Madsen, and T. Moody, *Ujamaa: Socialism from Above* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), p. 93.

132. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 459.

133. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 22.

134. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 2.7. The population consists of 17 million people on 800,000 square kilometers of land, which is sparsely populated, with the majority of the population on the borders. 90% of the population is agricultural, accounting for 80% of commodity production. *Ibid.*

135. Boesen, *et.al.*, *Ujamaa*, pp. 50-56.

pressurized middle peasantry¹³⁶ and rural allotment holders, with exact numbers and lines very unclear.¹³⁷ Class differentiation appeared to have gone furthest in the areas most heavily penetrated by commodity relations, along the fertile rim of the country, and least far in the most backward parts of the territory.¹³⁸ It was precisely such seemingly contradictory qualities to which Lenin referred when he noted that "capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in varied forms"¹³⁹ and that it exists "both where... development is low and where it is high."¹⁴⁰ It was also these same qualities which affected later developments.

TANZANIA'S RULING CLASS: THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CLASS CONTENT OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

Tanzania's most dramatic later development was an announcement in 1967 that it would pursue a "socialist" path following the now famous Arusha Declaration. Initially, this meant nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy, promoting communal production in rural

136. The term "middle peasantry" is used in the sense maintained by Lenin in contrast to rich capitalist peasants and poor allotment holding peasants. See V.I. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 184. Attempts have been made by Mbilinyi, "The Transition to Capitalism" and Awiti, "Economic Differentiation" to use Lenin's categories. Also see Phil Raikes, "Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 5, no. 3, (1978): 285-325; Boesen *et.al.*, Ujamaa; Cliffe, *et.al.*, *Rural Cooperation*; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*; Raikes, *State and Agriculture*. The degree of rural differentiation varies from one part of the country to another, with the greatest degree of differentiation occurring in the parts of the country that have historically been most heavily penetrated by capitalism. Much less is known about other parts of the country where commodity relations have been less well developed historically. In many cases the links between classes of peasants are unclear a) because one is seeing a process of classes in formation and b) because the state by its policies keeps these classes from maturing to their logical conclusion.

137. Feldman, "Social Differentiation" and H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, "Staffs, Kulaks, and Peasants: A Study of a Political Field," in *Socialism in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe and Saul, 2:153-177.

138. For further discussion of this see Iliffe, *A Modern History*; Boesen *et.al.*, *Ujamaa*; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*; Raikes, "Rural Differentiation;" *idem.*, "State and Agriculture," Chapters 2 and 3; H.U.E. Thoden van Velsen, "Some Obstacles to Ujamaa: A Case Study from Rungwe," in *Rural Cooperation*, ed. Cliffe *et.al.*, pp. 346-359; also *idem.*, in *Socialism in Tanzania*, ed. Saul and Cliffe, 2:153-179; Mbilinyi, "The Transition to Capitalism;" Shivji, *Class Struggles*; and the previously cited articles by Awiti, Raikes, Lawrence and Wayne in *Rural Cooperation*, ed. Cliffe, *et.al.*, pp. 37-144.

139. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism*, p. 181.

140. *Idem.*, *Collected Works*, 1:438.

“ujamaa” villages, and adopting a policy of “education for self-reliance,” which integrated agricultural work into the primary school curriculum. It also included a “leadership code” which prohibited senior state officials from holding more than one job, from having shares in or directing private companies, from owning rental property, and from employing wage labour. The effect of these policies was to inhibit the development of a bourgeoisie and to stunt capitalist development in Tanzania without producing a socialist alternative. The reasons why these populist policies were proposed and pursued have been discussed extensively, but are not well understood.¹⁴¹ Clearly they relate in part to the antecedents discussed above as well as to the historical exigencies of the time. Both in turn affected the class content of the independence movement and the class content of the post-colonial state. It is this class content which must be understood if one is to ascertain why Tanzania’s ruling class virtually cemented backward capitalist development after independence, and why it prohibited classic forms of capital accumulation without dismantling capitalism itself.

The historical weakness of Tanganyika’s bourgeoisie adversely influenced the course of capitalist development later. However impressive they were in terms of qualitative or regional influence, Tanganyika’s rural capitalists were “no more than a few hundred,”¹⁴² were scattered far from the capital, and did not act as a cohesive political force to control the independence movement. Here they mirrored the impotence of European settlers, with similar consequences from the standpoint of their *long* term interests. Significantly enough, Tanganyika’s kulaks did not unite to oppose Nyerere’s and TANU’s attack on the colonial state’s proposal for freehold land tenure.¹⁴³ This was in stark contrast to their Kenyan counterparts who clearly appreciated the relation between and the importance of private property to capitalist development. The emerging Kikuyu bourgeoisie in Kenya occupied the central spine of the country which cut through the capital of Nairobi. There, settler agriculture had led to widespread landlessness¹⁴⁴ and to prohibitions on Africans planting

141. For discussions of why the alternatives proposed were not initially socialist and the populism of the policies themselves see Mueller, “Retarded Capitalism” and *idem.*, “Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism.”

142. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 1.23.

143. It becomes critical to understand in class terms who was in favour of abolishing title deeds and who was against it. There is no available information to determine whether or not kulaks did or did not constitute a separate class apart from those in TANU who supported Nyerere’s view. For reasons not entirely understood, these capitalists may not have perceived it to be in their interest to oppose Nyerere and TANU. It is also possible that the implications of a lack of title deed might not have been appreciated by this class at this time.

144. Clearly proletarianization was not uniform in Kenya.

certain cash crops. In response, Kenya's evolving bourgeoisie was well-organized politically as early as the nineteen twenties.¹⁴⁵ By the nineteen thirties it reflected its own class interests at the Kenya Land Commission hearings, where it berated the colonial state for being "communist."¹⁴⁶ (Njonjo, Chapter II, 1977) and for not differentiating between them and the rest by allowing the "better farmers" to plant coffee and have individual titles to the land.¹⁴⁷ This class dominated the independence movement from its inception, partaking of populist and nationalist elements throughout, but never controlled by them. Kenya's big bourgeoisie essentially came to power to strip capital of its racial fetters and proceeded to smash its petit-bourgeois opponents who saw the situation somewhat differently. Ultimately, it was aided by the colonial state itself, which could be said to have done much of the dirty work¹⁴⁸ for the Kenyan bourgeoisie, beginning with primitive accumulation.

The class content of the independence movement in Tanganyika is less clear. It appears that in Tanganyika, rural capitalists apparently did not face the same urgency to control the independence movement as their Kenyan counterparts.¹⁴⁹ The colonial state did not alienate their land, did not prohibit them from growing lucrative cash crops, and they did not face a strongly organized group of settlers with the political clout to turn Tanganyika into a Rhodesia. A class analysis of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika has yet to be written. From what can be gathered, kulaks sometimes dominated TANU locally, but apparently did not control it nationally.¹⁵⁰ The question of why this happened is still obscure. Although important, this alone did not set the stage for the adoption of a Narodnik path by Tanzania's ruling class following the

145. In contrast, Gichuru, one of Kenya's leading nationalists, considered Tanganyikans "backward." Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 431.

146. Njonjo. "The Africanization of the White Highlands," Chapter 2.

147. The nascent bourgeoisie in Kenya could be said to have been fighting the colonial state's Narodism, trying to fetter indigenous accumulation, refusing to give title deed to the few.

148. First, it separated the producers from the means of production by alienating land. Second it smashed "Mau Mau" and made it impossible for the landless to regain that land. Third, it loaned the Kenyan ruling class the money to buy out British settlers and thereby gave this class the proper excuse to create a land market and to sell the land rather than to redistribute it to the landless.

149. In addition, from 1944 onwards, "Britain's main concern was Kenya" and she was preoccupied with the transfer of power there rather than in Tanganyika. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 475.

150. *Ibid.*, p. 516; Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 125. The evidence for these assertions in the writings on the nationalist movement is limited. Some authors including Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, have stressed the importance of Nyerere's leadership in determining the ideological choice begun in 1967; however, this has not been integrated into a class analysis of the period.

Arusha Declaration. Furthermore, from the evidence available,¹⁵¹ one cannot simply deduce the Narodnik-like character of the post-colonial state in Tanzania from the class content of the independence movement. In many respects, the movement itself was not very different from those in other states which later took a more strongly capitalist orientation. Like them it had a nationalist/populist base and it consisted of a variety of forces most accurately described as strange bedfellows.¹⁵² It garnered a great deal of support by attacking chiefs who had participated in enforced agricultural change, by organizing around local issues, and by opposing colonial proposals for multi-racialism. The nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was built up by clerks, teachers, farmers, traders, and occasionally by civil servants who joined illegally.¹⁵³ The party had a "weak central structure" and was strongest in the towns outside of Dar es Salaam.¹⁵⁴ The party was dominated by "local issues"¹⁵⁵ and was strengthened by the incorporation of a number of district cooperative unions designed to circumvent expatriate control of marketing which tended to be Asian outside the capital.¹⁵⁷

It appears that if one is to explain why Tanzania's ruling class sought to institutionalize populism after 1967, one must look beyond the class content of the independence movement itself to contemporary events and to other factors which helped to solidify what amounted to petit-bourgeois control of the state. These other factors included Tanganyika's *inability* to attract foreign capital in the first six years after independence and the country's internal difficulties.

Tanganyika's immediate strategy after independence was not novel. It was geared to offering attractive concessions to foreign investment, retaining expatriates in the civil service, deferring rapid Africanization, and continuing to support the "progressive" farmer. However, the strategy proved unworkable and Tanganyika soon began to experience financial difficulties. International capital continued to flow into Kenya, with Tanganyika perceived as too underdeveloped to compete in attrac-

151. The available evidence is not good.

152. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, pp. 485-571; Shivji, *Class Struggles*, pp. 56-60. The Tanganyika African Association began as an organization of teachers, civil servants, and traders opposing closer union with Kenya and Uganda. The nationalist party grew out of it and was formed in 1954.

153. See footnote 1.

154. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 31.

155. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 22-23.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

157. Nevertheless, by 1952 Africans owned 27,000 licenced shops; Asians, 7,500. However, Africans handled only a minority of total business. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 448.

tiveness.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, neither Kenya nor multinational capital found it in their interest to uphold the Kampala Agreement of 1964 which had planned for a specialization of industries among the countries of the East African Community and was designed to divert capital to Tanganyika to remedy past imbalances.¹⁶⁰ In addition, between 1964 and 1965, the situation was exacerbated by a further flight of international capital to the tune of Sh.290 million.¹⁶⁰ This flight followed a number of foreign policy pronouncements in which Tanzania threatened to recognize East Germany, broke off relations with Great Britain for not intervening against Rhodesia's UDI, began to offer support for Southern African liberation movements, and formed a United Republic of Tanzania, following Zanzibar's revolution.¹⁶¹ At the same time, the price of sisal, Tanzania's major export, fell precipitously and she felt the economic pinch.

However, the adoption of a populist path by Tanzania's ruling class was a response to internal factors as well. Tanganyika was already experiencing political instability even before it became clear she would have trouble attracting international capital. In 1964, Britain was called in to put down an army mutiny which arose over the continued retention of expatriates, the slow pace of Africanization, and poor pay. The demands echoed those of Tanzanian trade unionists who wanted a speedier takeover of top jobs by Africans, better pay, and proceeded to implement a series of strikes, which led to the loss of 417,000 man days in 1963 alone.¹⁶² Resentment was also building against Nyerere's attempts to retain expatriate civil servants from the colonial period and his proposed concessions to these Europeans on pension plans, retirement

158. "The leadership's overestimate of international capitalism's interest in the economy was due to a fundamental misunderstanding of international capitalism... To the extent that the Tanzanian economy lacked an industrial structure, more developed capitalist relations of production, a wide consumer market and important minerals, it was unlikely to attract significant capital inflows from international capitalism." Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, pp. 40-41.

159. One example: the General Tire factory in Tanzania was supposed to serve the entire East African market, but Firestone moved into Kenya. There was a general breakdown of the agreement after the Arusha Declaration, but the lack of confidence between the two countries was always there.

160. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 43. Germany withdrew money for an air training programme and Britain refused to proceed with a plan for Sh. 7.5 million in aid. In 1968, Tanzania began to attract new donors including Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 157.

161. Pratt, *ibid.*, pp. 134-152.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 110; Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 47; Andrew Coulson, *Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience* (London: Spokesman Books, 1979), p. 1. For a history of strikes in Tanzania see Dudley Jackson. "The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania: Incomes, Policy, and Industrial Democracy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 2 (1979): 219-252.

schemes, salaries, and multi-racial citizenship.¹⁶³ TANU responded by taking up these issues. The issues which TANU was forced to deal with were economic insolvency and political instability.

Nyerere's declaration of "socialism" in 1967,¹⁶⁴ with its nationalizations and restrictions on certain types of private accumulation was at one level a direct response to Tanganyika's inability to attract foreign capital for development and to her internal political difficulties. At another level, the rhetoric of national "self-reliance" and agrarian populism was the indigenous class' attempt to make an ideological virtue out of what they found to be politically necessary and economically expedient to insure their own survival. It was still further an attempt to mobilize the disenfranchised popular classes behind the state and eventually to force all other classes into dependence on it. It was above all a "pre-emptive move."¹⁶⁵ In certain respects the Arusha Declaration succeeded in dealing with the immediate problems facing the state, at least in an interim fashion. By stressing "African tradition," the anti-capitalist, anti-western thrust of much of the Arusha Declaration effectively gave the state a license to impress the peasantry into agricultural production and to extract surplus value without transforming the basis of production itself. In this respect, it was similar to the policies of the early colonial state which had preceded it. By stressing "socialism" without class struggle, the Arusha Declaration ironically enough also paved the way for a re-entry of external capital, thereby temporarily heading off further financial problems.

The way in which Tanganyika's ruling class chose to deal with the economic and political crises which faced it by 1967 were not predetermined, but a reflection of its material base. TANU was pre-eminently a party of the petit bourgeoisie.¹⁶⁶ In Kenya, petit bourgeois elements were pushed out of key positions in the state immediately after independence,¹⁶⁷ but in Tanzania, in the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, they succeeded in dominating the upper echelon of both the party and the state. Petit bourgeois control was further consolidated by the fact that before

163. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 129-133.

164. Clearly, Nyerere's response of "socialism" was not the only possible or potential response to this situation, but it was a possible one and one that was taken. *After* the Arusha Declaration, notwithstanding its "socialism," was when Tanzania began to attract a great deal of international aid.

165. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 2.7.

166. Shivji, *Class Struggles*, pp. 49-53.

167. Susanne D. Meuller, "Statist Economies and the Elimination of the K.P.U.: A Critique of Political Party Analysis and the Center-Periphery Argument" (Paper presented to the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1972).

independence, Nyerere had resisted turning TANU into a mass party and it had no history of armed struggle.¹⁶⁸ Shortly after independence, almost all of TANU's "abler administrators" went to other jobs and except for the National Executive Council, the party consisted of numerous experienced but uneducated political activists.¹⁶⁹ In addition, the administration did not provide a counterpoise to the party. Unlike Kenya, where the political party was effectively dismantled in favour of the administration after independence, the reverse held in Tanzania perhaps because the civil service was still an expatriate stronghold.¹⁷⁰ Although workers supported TANU in the early years, the ruling class began to dismantle the trade union movement by 1964 and the party increasingly consolidated its support around the lower echelons of the petit-bourgeoisie. As early as 1960, the TANU Executive Council voted to turn back the colonial state's land reform policies of the nineteen fifties and to abolish freehold tenure,¹⁷¹ whilst party publications often did not surmount "racialist radicalism."¹⁷²

It was to this petit bourgeois constituency¹⁷³ that the Tanzanian ruling class turned when it was unable to attract the capital to follow its *original* strategy and internal instabilities threatened its own longevity. In 1962, Nyerere temporarily resigned to upgrade the party with Kawawa becoming Prime Minister. The period was used to increase TANU's power, to consolidate the support of the petit bourgeoisie, and to politically dismantle the popular classes. The Government opened up the civil service to Africans and in the rural areas it promoted the expansion of producer marketing cooperatives, which increased from 857 in 1961 to 1518 in 1965, with their membership expanding by over 100,000 members between December 1962 and 1963. Simultaneously, it made TANU part of the Government, turned Tanzania into a one party state, and

168. "(T)he attainment of independence was not primarily the outcome of a domestic class struggle. Rather it was the result of a constellation of various historical circumstances in which *external* forces played an important role: the general crisis of colonialism after the Second War, the pressure of the United States to open up the colonies to all capitalist nations, and the armed struggle by some of the more advanced colonies were all contributory factors." Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, pp. 32-33.

169. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 210-211. This was true in Kenya as well, but the party there was quashed.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 105.

171. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 575.

172. Colin Leys, "Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence," in *Socialism in Tanzania*, ed. Cliffe and Saul, ed., 1:187; also, Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 1.13.

173. Other constituencies were not potential bases of support: Europeans dominated the higher reaches of the civil service, Asians dominated trade, and the rural capitalist class was small and weak.

introduced a Preventive Detention Law.¹⁷⁴ The independence of the umbrella trade union organization, the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), was also dismantled. The Government renamed it the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), made it an affiliate of TANU, appointed the Minister of Labour as its General Secretary, and proceeded to “effectively ban...strikes.”¹⁷⁵ The policies on land and cooperatives in the early post-independence period were not socialist but nationalist measures; in one case they were measures which eliminated “non-indigenous” claims to landed property, in the other, Asian traders.”¹⁷⁶

Although these policies had petit bourgeois appeal, it is important to stress that they also cut across class lines. To emerging capitalists, the policies adopted by the ruling class in the immediate post-independence period could not then have been perceived as threatening, either to those in the rural areas or to those in the upper echelons of the civil service. The policies were geared to repressing the popular classes and controlling political participation, hardly anti-bourgeois inclinations. Other policies had the immediate virtue of eliminating competition from expatriates, opening up new business opportunities, and curtailing political and economic demands. Furthermore, with respect to the reversion of the late colonial policy on individual title deeds to land and its potential threat to capital accumulation by an indigenous bourgeois class, Rweyemamu suggests that there is no immediate effect. As he argues:

there was moreover no other policy on land, its distribution or land tenure. People were merely urged to expand their acreage of crops without consideration being given on the eventual effect of these expansions on land tenure and class formation.¹⁷⁷

Initially then, TANU's early anti-capitalist land policy - which was no more than a throw back to that of the early colonial period - did not keep rural capitalists from accumulating any more than it had in the past. Eventually, following the Arusha Declaration and the periods of “ujamaa” and villagization, it heightened the dependence of this class on the state, increased its insecurity,¹⁷⁸ and at times kept it from operating openly as capitalist. In the interim, it potentially enhanced the political and economic leverage of the larger, more dominant, and more vocal petit-bourgeoisie over its larger capitalist competitors, an effect appreciated by

174. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 187-191.

175. Jackson, “The Disappearance of Strikes,” p. 227.

176. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization*, p. 48.

177. *Ibid.*

178. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 2.28, p. 3.9.

the latter perhaps only in retrospect.¹⁷⁹ The absence of title deeds sometimes “subordinate(d)” rich peasants to state officials.¹⁸⁰ It also assured the state of its potential clout to control land use by all classes, a fact of great significance, given the historical importance of agriculture in surplus accumulation and the want of industrial alternatives.¹⁸¹ Finally, of course, the absence of freehold land titles stunted the development of agrarian capitalism and cemented its backwardness. As Raikes notes:

In the absence of registered (or any other secure) property rights, (rich peasants have had) to engage in political manoeuvring not simply for gain but in order to keep a reasonably secure hold on what they have got.¹⁸²

The policies adopted by the Tanzanian ruling class prior to 1967, were not socialist. What the land policy indicated, however, was the predominance of petit bourgeois control over the state and a certain hostility to big capital. The various sections of the Arusha Declaration demonstrated these same tendencies. The question of why they were proposed by the ruling class and accepted by emerging capitalists is nevertheless puzzling given the manner in which parts of the Declaration restricted the opportunities for private accumulation.

From a certain perspective, the absence of overt hostility to the Arusha Declaration by bourgeois elements is easily comprehensible. The popularity of the nationalization policies, for instance, is not difficult to understand. They opened up a whole range of positions to Tanzanians which had formerly been occupied by expatriates and brought what had been a private job market under the wing of the state. The policies were widely applauded by the lower echelons of TANU, few of whom had “professional or technical skills” and for whom “a loss of political office would have meant an eventual return to peasant farming.”¹⁸³ Nationalization was also the material confirmation of Nyerere’s “dependencia” theorizing that Tanzania’s only alternative to national self-reliance was becoming a “very junior partner” to foreign capital, with “independent capitalist development impossible.”¹⁸⁴ From the standpoint of capital accumulation, nationalization may also not have appeared problematic.

179. Whether or not “larger capitalist” and “petit bourgeoisie” are accurate and whether or not they can be conceived as competitors at this point in history is an empirical question that awaits further research.

180. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 10.21.

181. Whether this fact of control was appreciated at the time is again an empirical question. Given the lack of good data, there is a tendency to read Tanzania’s history backwards in a functionalist manner.

182. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 3.9; also, pp. 2.8.-2.9.

183. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 185.

184. Julius Nyerere quoted in Coulson, *Socialism in Practice*, p. 4, p. 21.

Given the general backwardness of the economy, the state may have seemed for many the most attractive and secure source of accumulation available. The prohibitions on private accumulation only affected "leaders" and not the majority of civil servants and party members. Once one descended from the "commanding heights" of nationalization, over half the economy was still privately run.¹⁸⁵ Consequently, this part of the Arusha Declaration had a great deal of support. Indeed, it may well have seemed to be the best of two worlds; it opened up opportunities in the state without foreclosing the possibility of private accumulation.

Less well understood, is the question of why Tanzania's ruling class adopted a "leadership code" which effectively fettered its own ability to accumulate.¹⁸⁶ Apparently, certain parts of the ruling class were not generally receptive to these directives in the Arusha Declaration, which prohibited top leaders in TANU and the Government from simultaneously working for the state and engaging in private enterprise. But finally "they were accepted," although little is known about how they were initiated or approved.¹⁸⁷ At one level, the ruling class itself appeared to be committing economic suicide, by foreclosing their opportunities for entrepreneurship. At another level, they were also engaging in a strategic act of political legitimation¹⁸⁸ which did not ultimately have negative implications for the class as a whole. From the perspective of the times, however, it seems clear there were different factions within the ruling class who had different conceptions of the optimal strategy to be pursued at this particular point in history.¹⁸⁹ Some looked enviously across the border at their Kenyan counterparts who were already having a capitalist field day. Others, like Nyerere, had already mobilized their support from the lower echelons of the TANU petit bourgeoisie, built up in the troubled mid-nineteen sixties. These lower echelons were not directly affected by

185. Again, it would be interesting to know what has happened in this other half, especially in terms of its relationship to state officials and rural capitalists.

186. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 237. Some see Nyerere as the lone "socialist" and argue that "there were no substantial political or class demands for a socialist initiative." *Ibid.*, p. 228. I disagree with Pratt on the former point, but agree on the latter. Others see the acceptance of these parts of the Arusha Declaration as an initial victory for the "progressive" wing of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." See Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies," p. 362; Shivji, *Class Struggles*, p. 98; Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version," *Review of African Political Economy* No. 8 (1977): 75-89.

187. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 237.

188. I would like to thank Jordan Gebremedhin for a useful discussion on this point. Obviously, this class could have simply repressed the petit bourgeoisie as happened in Kenya. Perhaps it felt that it did not have the allies to support it.

189. Identifying these factions is an *empirical* question awaiting further research. Furthermore, it is important to understand who Nyerere was in terms of these factions.

the directives of the "leadership code." If anything, they appeared to feed into their interests as they had the effect of forestalling a competitive class of big capitalists. Furthermore, those parts of the ruling class who were antagonized by the code were quickly accommodated. As Pratt has noted:

Leaders were allowed to transfer the ownership of property to a trust which they could set up in the name of their children. This meant that investments in property whose purpose was to provide for the future needs of a leader's children were again permissible. The second compromise limited the ban on the employment of labour to workers who were employed on a permanent and full-time basis. This permitted many leaders in the rural areas who were also substantial farmers to continue to employ casual labour in periods of peak-labour need.¹⁹⁰

In addition, the directives had certain interim advantages. Politically, the directives helped the ruling class to maintain the illusion of classlessness in Tanzania with the suggestion that the rulers themselves were not exploiters, but "men of the people."¹⁹¹ Economically, they did not clamp down on exploitation *per se*, simply on capitalist forms of exploitation. Hence, the parts of the "leadership code" which prohibited the hiring of wage labour were in certain respects in keeping with the backwardness of this class as a *capitalist* class. Furthermore, these same directives had the added virtue of elevating exploitation on the basis of "pre-capitalist" social relations to the lofty heights of "socialism." In short, the state could be said to be assisting its ruling class to accumulate prior to the political and economic maturity of the class itself. From the standpoint of those who were genuinely antagonistic to the directives of the leadership code, the option of open political opposition was not really there. As Raikes has noted:

colonialist and racialist views were sufficiently prevalent that the talk of a domestic exploiting class or criticism of the operations of the state could rather easily be mistaken as personalized criticism of the new African members of the civil service.¹⁹³

Furthermore, given the populist character of the "leadership code" and

190. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 239.

191. Chinua Achebe, *A Man of the People* (London: Heinemann, 1966).

192. Again, the question as to how backward this ruling class was is open to empirical research. Who were they prior to independence, what did they become just after independence, what was their position on key issues, what is their position now in relation to other rural and urban classes and are they and if so how are they using their accumulated salaries to transform themselves into a capitalist class? Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 1.27. Also see Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 235; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*, p. 63.

193. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 1.13.

the already repressive political atmosphere,¹⁹⁴ it would have been “very difficult to oppose (the directives) publicly” and “for most of (the ruling class), the eventual gains “exceeded the losses they would suffer...”¹⁹⁵ An indirect indicator of the gains was recurrent government expenditure which proceeded to rise by 20% *per annum*¹⁹⁶ in the nineteen sixties and a salariat, which began to “develop into an upper class.”¹⁹⁷

The all out attacks on “exploiters” and “capitalists” which were part of the Arusha Declaration and became more vociferous later, were neither “socialist” nor mere mystification. They were the result of real material contradictions between the need for revenues to support a burgeoning “state bureaucracy” and the same policies of the state which had opened up the opportunities for petit-bourgeois accumulation in the nineteen sixties. As Musti notes, quoting Cournanel:

the whole (bureaucratic) bourgeoisie constantly reproduces a tendency to appropriate privately the means of production. Thus individualized modes of realization of surplus value are in action at the expense of common class interests. As a consequence “the state bourgeoisie spontaneously tends to transform itself into (a) ‘private’ bourgeoisie and to reinforce the latter which on the other hand is always present on the side of the first.”¹⁹⁸

Hence, the seeming contradiction that the very policies which were adopted and needed by the Tanzanian ruling class at a general level to support their own reproduction and to avert political and economic crises were subverted in private as this class also appeared at times to be a class of accumulators in the process of transformation. At a concrete level, this contradiction was manifested by the fiscal crisis in the cooperative movement in the nineteen sixties and later by the somewhat perverse relationship among rural kulaks, state officials, and poor peasants during the period of “ujamaa” and villagization.¹⁹⁹ In discussing the ruling class’ attitude to the Arusha Declaration’s proposal for communal production under “ujamaa,” von Freyhold notes,

194. There is little written on the repressive functions of the state, a subject emphasized by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. For an attempt to remedy this gap in the case of Kenya see Mueller, “Statist Economies.”

195. Coulson, *Socialism in Practice*, p. 3.

196. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

197. Boesen *et al.*, *Ujamaa*, p. 96.

198. Bruno Musti de Gennaro, “Ten Years After: A Comment on the Ruvuma Development Association” (Paper presented to the Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 16 October 1978).

199. Village officials, who were often party officials, sometimes accumulated by short-weighting peasants’ produce.

Collectively they were in favour of the expansion of the economic power of the state, individually they hoped to become private and usually agricultural capitalists after their early retirement.²⁰⁰

Consequently, from the perspective of a *burgeoning* state in need of resources, rural kulaks needed to be attacked, while from another perspective they were in fact the future allies of the state's bureaucrats themselves.²⁰¹ The result was that:

Those who manned the state and the Party were in favour of nationalizing all those ventures that were beyond their reach, but certainly against a communalization that would have left them without private opportunities.

From the standpoint of the dominant groups in the Party and the state the plea of the President for democratic communalization thus appeared to be something like an aberration. They did not contradict him openly, first because they needed him to appease workers and peasants and secondly because they expected that in practice the whole campaign would look quite different - as indeed it did. Eventually the bureaucracy managed to turn the slogan of Ujamaa into a tool which could be used for its own purposes. Workers could be told that their wage claims were illegitimate because the nation needed the funds for the socialist reconstruction of the countryside and that compared to the peasants they were selfish individualists. The unemployed could be collected and sent back to the villages to build Ujamaa. Kulaks and peasants who stood up to oppose certain bureaucratic measures and orders could be told that they obstructed Ujamaa and in the end even the subordination of the peasantry under a new authoritarian bureaucracy that reached down to the village level could be legitimized in the name of Ujamaa.²⁰²

The victims of the contradictions produced by the policy of "ujamaa" as well as the other parts of the Arusha Declaration were increasingly the popular classes. It was they who were herded into "ujamaa" villages and expected to produce surpluses for the state. The popular classes suffered more and more from a repressive state which needed greater and greater surpluses to survive its unending expansion and to transform its ruling class.²⁰³ However, neither the expanding state alone nor the apparent and intermittent looting of state coffers by individual bureaucrats produced the contradictions which created periodic financial crises at the general level of the state. It was instead the coupling of these tendencies with a Narodnik organization of production, which precluded increases in the

200. Von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*, p. 120.

201. Officials were sometimes kulaks. At the upper echelons of the state, some officials might well hope to escape an agrarian future.

202. Von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*, p. 120.

203. Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, p. 218; Coulson, *Socialism in Practice*, p. 12; Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 2.4.

productivity of labour and extraction other than on the basis of absolute surplus value. Capitalism was thereby stunted in its most backward form and turned into a zero sum game. In addition to sanctifying exploitation on the basis of pre-capitalist relations and insuring the perpetuation of a landed petit bourgeoisie, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 did nothing to transform the social relations of production or the productive forces. The extraction of surplus value depended on expanding a middle peasantry engaged in cash crop production. Production and consumption remained integrated at the level of the household, with no transformation in either the productive forces or in the value of labour power possible. There was a limit to how much surplus value could be produced or extracted short of transformation and the state responded by becoming increasingly repressive. "Strikes... virtually... disappeared" and political participation was increasingly circumscribed.²⁰⁴ This petit bourgeois capital which parasitically fed upon peasants and workers also clung like a dying vulture. It reinforced what appeared as "pre-capitalist" relations;²⁰⁵ relations which were in fact necessary for middle and poor peasants to survive and for rich peasants to accumulate. These appearances were in fact the only available means by which individuals could respond to a state that had cut off the possibility of full-fledged capitalist relations of production by implanting and resurrecting a Narodnik form of populism which had its roots in the policies of the early colonial state. These appearances reinforced the petit bourgeois interpretation that it was a recalcitrant and traditional peasantry²⁰⁶ which was acting to subvert the state and its allegedly "socialist" policies. In fact, it was the state's own petit bourgeois policies of capitalist development which had cemented backwardness.

CONCLUSION

When the colonial state in Tanganyika was unable to attract development funds or industrial capital, it responded by expanding middle peasant household production, using force to counteract the contradictions created by its own policies, and ultimately dismantling the policies themselves. The post-colonial state took up some of the same options for related reasons. However, the contradictions were sometimes even starker. The period after the 1950s was a period of monopoly capitalism

204. Jackson "The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania," p. 219. Although formal strikes did disappear, this did not stop the downing of tools, go slows, etc.

205. Raikes, *State and Agriculture*, p. 2.28; Boesen, *Ujamaa*, p. 93, p. 160; von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages*, p. 39.

206. Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

in which scientific agriculture became more important and the necessary quality and quantity controls were bound to exert increasingly greater pressures on an untransformed middle peasantry. Also, a new force had arisen: an unproductive ruling class whose only response to declining agricultural surpluses was a more extensive and forceful entry into the sphere of production to insure its own reproduction as a class. The contradictions of its failures were exhibited by declining agricultural production and an increasingly repressive state.²⁰⁷ Eventually, they led to renewed invitations to international finance capital, which, too, faces the contradictions of the backwardness which it has subsidized.²⁰⁸

Tanzania's ruling class lacked the material base to act like its Kenya counterparts and was not prepared to support land policies which would develop capital out of its control and proletarianize a middle peasantry. Hence, while Kenya devised policies to support the further development of a big bourgeoisie, its poorer sister "chose" Narodism to institutionalize a petit bourgeoisie and small capitalism.

207. Coulson, *Socialism in Practice*, p. 13; Werner Olle and Wolfgang Scheller, "World Market Conditions and National Average Conditions of Labour" (Occasional Paper No. 77.1, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, October 1977).

208. See "'David' Nyerere Takes on IMF Goliath," pp. 33-35 for the renewed conditions for IMF loans to Tanzania and the rejection of these proposals by Nyerere.